The ongoing legal debate in Laboratory Corp. of America v. Davis revolves around whether a federal court can certify a class action that includes plaintiffs who have not experienced any harm or injury.
This case represents yet another in a series of complex legal battles this year, with arguments being made before the court without fully addressing the central question on which the justices granted their review.
Labcorp, in its opening brief, presents a strong and clear argument. The company asserts that federal courts cannot provide relief to plaintiffs who have not suffered a legally recognized injury.
The specifics of the case begin with Labcorp’s implementation of automated check-in kiosks at its facilities. While many customers appreciate these kiosks, one major issue has surfaced: they are not accessible to blind individuals.
This issue has led to the class action, where the blind claim that the kiosks disadvantage them, potentially holding Labcorp liable under various legal theories.
The case becomes complicated when Labcorp describes the class of plaintiffs involved. The class, according to Labcorp, includes all blind individuals who have been exposed to the kiosks, regardless of whether they knew about the kiosks or even wanted to use them.
Labcorp argues that blind individuals who were unaware of the kiosks or had no intention of using them should not be considered injured parties.
Therefore, a class that includes these uninjured individuals could lead to a problematic class certification, which may force Labcorp into a massive settlement it argues would be unjustified.
This raises the question of whether the class definition is too broad. Labcorp’s argument hinges on the idea that a class including blind people who have not experienced any harm could lead to an unfair resolution.
This concern will likely be met with suspicion from justices who are wary of class certifications that can pressure companies into settlements. In particular, justices who are cautious of the so-called “extortionate” power of class actions will likely find this case troubling.
However, there are complications in this case that make it difficult to reach a definitive conclusion. The first issue has plagued many cases this term: the likelihood that the current legal question may not even be the central issue in the case.
It’s important to note that the district court, at an earlier stage, certified a class that excluded blind individuals who did not attempt or want to use the kiosks. This more limited class was in line with Labcorp’s argument that only those who have suffered a cognizable injury should be included.
But, as the case progressed, Labcorp raised objections to the narrower class definition, and as a result, the court ultimately expanded the class to include all blind individuals exposed to the kiosks.
At the time of the appeal, Labcorp had already appealed the case before the class definition was adjusted. Because of this, it’s unclear whether the class definition issue is even relevant to the appeals process.
The justices may find it difficult to assess the validity of Labcorp’s objections, especially since the case has evolved, and the current class definition may not match the one Labcorp initially contested.

A second issue is the “slippery slope” argument, which complicates the decision-making process. Labcorp’s argument appears to suggest an absolute rule that a class action cannot include even a single individual who has not suffered a cognizable injury.
However, in the course of the argument, Labcorp acknowledges that, in some cases, uninjured individuals may need to be included for practical reasons.
The company’s complaint, then, isn’t about excluding all uninjured individuals, but rather about the sheer number of uninjured individuals included in this particular case.
This type of imprecise argument is difficult for the justices to evaluate. A firm, clear rule of exclusion might be easier to address than a case that revolves around the relative number of uninjured parties in the class.
In my view, some justices may believe that it is possible to sort out which plaintiffs are injured and which are not when it comes time to determine the appropriate remedy.
For these justices, this case may feel like much ado about nothing, as they may see the issue as one that can be worked out during the relief phase, rather than at the class certification stage.
However, the larger focus of the case may be on the technicalities of the legal proceedings, specifically the issues regarding which details are properly before the court of appeals and which ones aren’t.
The crux of the matter is that Labcorp has been challenged on procedural grounds. The justices may spend most of their time discussing the procedural issues rather than the underlying legal principles about class action certification.
In this sense, the case may not even be the right vehicle for the justices to address the larger question of whether uninjured plaintiffs can be included in a class action.
One can’t help but wonder why the law clerks haven’t done a better job of ensuring that all these procedural matters are thoroughly addressed before the case is presented for oral arguments. After all, the court could be spending its time on cases that more directly raise the legal questions it was supposed to address.
As the justices deliberate, the ultimate question may not be whether Labcorp’s arguments are correct but whether the case is the right one to answer such a complex and contentious issue about class action lawsuits and the certification process.
With numerous legal complexities at play, it remains to be seen how the Court will ultimately rule on the matter of including uninjured plaintiffs in a class action lawsuit.